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Abstract:  I use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the 
English auction (EA) and the first price sealed bid auction (FPA) when procuring 
a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are lower in the FPA than in the 
EA. Bids and prices in EA agree with game theoretic predictions while they don’t 
in the FPA. To resolve these deviations found in the FPA, I consider a mixture 
model with three bidding rules: constant absolute mark-up, constant percentage 
mark-up, and strategic best response. A dynamic specification is estimated as a 
hidden Markov model. Initially about three quarters of the subjects are strategic 
bidders, but over time the number of strategic bidders falls to below sixty-five 
percent. There is a corresponding growth in those who bid a constant absolute 
mark-up above realized cost. This model provides an explanation of the dynamics 
of the mean and variance of price. 
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I. Introduction 
I study the empirical properties of procurement costs and the behavior of participants in 
two basic procurement auctions, the first price sealed bid auction (FPA) and the English auction 
(EA). For currents purposes, commodities are goods for which the procurement official considers 
price the sole differentiating attribute among suppliers. The data come from a series of controlled 
laboratory experiments. The design of the experiments is such that inferences on performance, 
behavior, and dynamics are made without concern for estimating suppliers’ costs or the 
procurement official’s willingness-to-pay. A summary of the major findings is the mean and 
variance of procurement costs are lower in the FPA, price performance and bidding behavior are 
consistent with Nash equilibrium in the EA but not the FPA, there is discrete heterogeneity in 
bidding behavior in the FPA in which some subjects use simple mark-up strategies while others 
bid strategically, and with repeated participation in auctions the proportion of strategic bidders 
surprisingly decreases. 
These results are relevant to the procurement official evaluating whether to switch from 
using traditional request for quotes to using dynamic reverse auctions. In a dynamic reverse 
auction potential suppliers can successively submit bids, observe the vector of all submitted bids 
(but not the bidders’ identities), and in turn can lower their bids. When no supplier wishes to 
improve her bid, the auction closes and the procurer selects the supplier offering the best 
combination of price and non-price attributes. In the case of a commodity, the lowest bidding 
supplier wins and the dynamic reverse auction reduces to the EA. In a request for quote, each 
supplier submits a single price without knowledge of the prices submitted by other suppliers. 
Like the dynamic reverse auction, the procurer selects the supplier offering the best combination 
of price and non-price attributes. And in the case of commodities, the lowest bidding supplier 
wins – and receives a price equal to his bid – the request for quote reduces to a FPA. The 
commodity case is particularly relevant because this where many organizations choose to start 
dynamic reverse auction initiatives. 
Many early users of dynamic reverse auctions reported savings of twenty percent or 
greater1, spurring a wave of adoption (Cafkin  2007 and Jap 2007). Since procurement 
organizations are usually responsible for sourcing a variety of goods, it is neither feasible nor 
                                                 
1 Two academic case studies reporting forty-three and twenty percent savings respectively are Kinney 2000 and 
Stein 2003. 
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prudent to start using reverse auctions for all purchases. Given the belief that reverse auctions 
drive prices lower - the conventional wisdom advocated in industry, for example Purchasing.com 
2001 and Chafkin 2007, and academic literatures, see Jap 2002 and Elmaghraby 2007 -  is that a 
new adopter should start with commodities. This paper suggests the opposite is true: 
commodities are a poor choice for starting a reverse auction initiative and will likely result in 
higher prices on average and great price variability. Moreover, the distribution of prices in the 
EA experiments first order stochastically dominates the distribution of prices in the FPA 
experiments.  
This study also contributes new insights into bidder behavior in independent private costs 
(or values in the case of a selling an object) auctions.2 The majority of behavioral research in 
auction has focused on the situation of selling goods rather than procurement (see Kagel 1995 
and Kagel 2010 for extensive surveys).  Most of this research, detailed later, demonstrates that 
while standard game theoretic predictions of performance and behavior are robust in the EA, 
they are some consistent deviations in the FPA. The same patterns hold true here, which is not 
surprising as the procurement environment is a mirror image of the sell auction one. However, 
the procurement setting does help uncover a new explanation for the deviations in the FPA. 
There is a discrete heterogeneity in the subjects’ bidding rules.  
I present an equilibrium model of bidding in the FPA based upon a mixture of strategic 
and rule-of-thumb bidders.  Then a dynamic version of this model is estimated as a hidden 
Markov model: the latent variable is the rule a subject follows in each auction period.  I estimate 
initially only three-quarters of the subjects follow a strategic bidding rule, and the remaining 
subjects follow either an absolute or a percentage mark-up rule. The estimated dynamics surprise 
as bidders becomes less strategic. After participating in a sequence of thirty auctions less than 
two-thirds of the subjects are bidding strategically, concurrently there is a corresponding rise in 
those who simply bid a small fixed absolute amount above costs. This dynamic model can 
explain the observed slow decay of the mean and variance of the winning auction price over time.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section is a review of the relevant Marketing 
literatures. This is followed by the development of hypothesis regarding the performance of the 
                                                 
2 Independent and private here refers to the fact suppliers’ costs are independent  random variables for which the 
realizations are private information, and  buyers’ values are independent private random variables in auctions where 
potential buyer’s compete to purchase a good.     
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two auction types. Next, I present the details of the experimental design and features. Then, there 
is an empirical analysis of the price performance and bidder behavior in the experiments. After 
which there is a section on the theoretical mixture bidding model for the FPA and a subsequent 
section on the estimation results of a hidden Markov dynamic version of the model. I conclude 
the paper with comments on implications of the results and possible extensions. 
II. Related Marketing Literature on Auctions 
With the development of new information technologies, auctions are a growing part of 
the market allocation landscape in both final (Reilly 2000) and input (Jap 2002) goods markets. 
Correspondingly, the study of auctions and strategic interactions are enjoying a growing 
presence in academic Marketing research.  Recurrent themes are different models of behavior are 
needed in strategic environments versus individual decision making – see Amaldoss et al. 2008, 
statistical modeling of auction data, the effectiveness of alternative auction formats, and the 
impact auctions have on relationships between firms in the supply chain.  
Auction proliferation has generated vast amounts of data and led to new areas of 
empirical work. Many studies develop structural models of bidding behavior and use them to 
estimate properties of bidders and auctioneers. For example, Chan et al. 2007 and Song and Mela 
2008 use structural models to estimate supply and demand from online auctions to sell goods. 
From name-your-own-price auctions for electronic goods, Abbas and Hahn 2010 estimated 
bidders’ coefficients of relative risk attitude. Other studies have focused on formulating and 
estimating models that forecast bidding and prices in auctions.  Jap and Naik 2008, and Bradlow 
and Park 2007 both present a reduced form models for forecasting bidding behavior in dynamic 
auctions.  Park and Bradlow 2005 present a model that is structural and forecasts bidding 
behavior. The current study contributes to these efforts by introducing a new model of discrete 
heterogeneity and a dynamic statistical model of learning across auctions. 
Information technology advances have made auction design variations quick and low cost 
to implement, and correspondingly spawned numerous studies comparing the performance of 
alternative auction rules and formats. The current study follows such a comparative static 
approach. Other examples, beyond the studies on procurement auctions review later, include 
Dholakia and Simonson’s 2005 study showing how including explicit reference points to 
competing prices raises auction prices, and Fay 2004 which shows that multiple versus single bid 
formats of name-your-own price auctions are empirically revenue equivalent.  The large number 
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and often varying in format concurrent auctions for the same products suggests analyzing 
competition between auction formats; this is in contrast to the traditional view of either/or 
comparative static analysis. Haruvy et al 2008 surveys this burgeoning literature.  
A different strand of research considers the impact of reverse auctions in the larger 
context of buyer-supplier relationships within the supply chain. Jap 2003 and Jap 2007 document 
that adopting reverse auctions can reduce supplier performance when applied to an existing pool 
of suppliers and can damage log run relationship development. Jap and Haruvy 2008 analyze 
twelve different reverse auctions across various products and conduct pre and post auction 
surveys of the participant. They find that a supplier’s incumbency status and willingness to make 
buyer specific investments are both inversely related to how aggressive they bid. And the counter 
also holds; the most aggressive bidders are less likely to make relationship investments. In this 
study, we demonstrate that the supplier’s financial benefits have much greater variability in the 
reverse auction, and this is a potential source of the negative impact on buyer-supplier 
relationships. 
    
III. Analytical Analysis and Development of Hypotheses 
Let’s start by defining a simple commodity procurement situation. A procurement 
official’s task is to purchase an indivisible unit of a commodity as cheaply as possible. There are 
n potential suppliers indexed by i. Each supplier can provide a unit of the commodity for the cost 
of ci, which is incurred only if they supply the unit.  The cost ci is only known by supplier i – i.e. 
it is private information, and will typically vary across suppliers.   Suppliers are symmetric in 
that none has an ex ante cost advantage. Specifically, each of the supplier’s costs are drawn 
independently from a uniform distribution on the interval [cL, cH ].  A supplier will know his own 
realized costs, but only the distribution of the other suppliers’ costs. The procurement official 
only knows that each supplier’s cost is drawn independently from this uniform distribution. 
We consider two sourcing methods for this scenario. In the adopted version of the EA an 
initial high price is selected and all n suppliers are in the auction. Then the price gradually falls. 
At any point a supplier can irreversibly exit the auction. The number of remaining suppliers and 
current price are always publically posted. When the second to last supplier exits, leaving a sole 
remaining supplier, the auction closes. The last remaining supplier wins the auction and receives 
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the closing auction price, p. The winning seller receives a profit of p - ci, and all other suppliers 
receive zero profit.3 
Game theoretic analysis - Vickrey 1961 - reveals that the supplier has a weakly dominant 
strategy: remain in the auction as long as the price is greater than the supplier’s unit cost and exit 
when the price equals cost.4  The intuition is that all losing suppliers are driven to the point 
where their profit margin is zero, and thus revealing their true costs, before exiting the auction. 
Moreover, the supplier with the lowest realized cost wins the auction and receives a price equal 
to the second lowest realized cost. 
In a FPA, each supplier privately submits a price. Then the procurement official 
purchases from the lowest priced supplier, and that supplier receives is paid a price equal to his 
bid. This procurement FPA is equivalent to a first price sealed bid auction to sell an indivisible 
unit.5 The pure strategy symmetric Nash Equilibrium of this RFQ calls for a supplier to submit a 
price according to the following function of realized costs and the number of potential suppliers, 
Vickrey 1961: 
݌௜ሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ
௖ಹାሺ௡ିଵሻ௖೔
௡
 . 
                                                 
3 There are other formats of the reverse auction. For example, in an open outcry format individual suppliers can 
announce successively lower bids until there is no supplier willing to improve upon the current existing price. The 
supplier submitting the last price wins the auction at that price. In the strategic analysis, optimal bidder behavior is 
equivalent in the open outcry and version we describe.  
4 One can find standard arguments for this weakly dominant strategy in texts like (Krishner 2002). A weakly 
dominant strategy in this context means that regardless of the other suppliers’ strategy there is never an instance in 
which the supplier can strictly increase his expected payoff by deviating from this strategy.  
5 To see the equivalence, define the supplier’s private value as cH – ci, the potential amount of value he can offer 
below the highest possible cost, and define the bid as, cH – pi, the amount of value the supplier actually offers to the 
buyer.  
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This pricing strategy has an interesting behavioral interpretation; a supplier’s price is the 
expected second lowest realized cost conditional upon his cost being the lowest. Now consider 
the EA. The winning supplier, who has the lowest realized cost, receives the price equal to the 
second lowest realized cost. This is an example of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem in 
auction theory,6 and forms our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis I: The expected prices in the FPA and the EA are the same.  
To get a better insight on the revenue equivalence principle, let’s consider an example 
with three suppliers whose costs are independent and uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 20]. 
In this case the expected value of the lowest, second lowest, and highest cost are five, ten, and 
fifteen respectively. Figure 1 depicts the expected outcome under the Nash equilibrium. In the 
EA, the winner’s expected cost is five. Furthermore, the expected second lowest cost, and the 
corresponding auction price, is ten. In the FPA, we expect the winning supplier’s cost is also five 
and for him to bid ten, the expected second lowest cost conditional upon five being the lowest.   
Of course while the expected - or average - prices are the same, the distribution of prices 
is not. In the EA it is easy to see that that actual winning price can occur anywhere on the 
interval [0, 20]. On the other hand, the support of possible prices is smaller in the FPA. If a 
supplier’s realized cost is zero then conditional expectation of the second lowest cost is six and 
two-thirds, and this is the supplier’s FPA bid. At the other extreme with a realized cost of twenty, 
the conditional expectation of the second lowest cost, and the corresponding quoted price, is 
twenty. Cleary the distribution of prices in the EA is a mean preserving spread of the prices in 
the FPA.  In fact, Vickery (1962) shows that with independent and uniformly distributed costs 
and n bidders the variance of the price in the EA is ଶሺ௡ିଵሻ
ሺ௡ାଶሻሺ௡ାଵሻమ
ሺܿு െ ܿ௅ሻଶ  and in the FPA is  
ሺ௡ିଵሻమ
௡ሺ௡ାଶሻሺ௡ାଵሻమ
ሺܿு െ ܿ௅ሻଶ. So the variance in the EA price is greater than that of the FPA by a 
factor of 2݊ ݊ െ 1⁄ . This is our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis II: The variance of EAs prices is greater than that of the FPA.  
With respect to the suppliers, the expected profit will be the same in both the EA and the 
FPA; the expected lowest cost less the expected second lowest cost multiplied by the probability 
                                                 
6 The revenue equivalence theorem was first proven by Vickery 1961 and is applicable to our scenario. It was 
proven for a wider class of scenarios by Myerson 1981. For our concerns the version used here states that if sellers 
are risk neutral, have independent and symmetric costs, and payment is function of the bid only, then the FPA and 
the reverse auction will have the same expected price. 
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of being the lowest cost supplier. In our example, this is $1.67. However, the difference is the 
variance of expected payoff is much higher than for the procurement official. The variances for 
the supplier profit in the EA is ௡
ሺ௡ାଶሻሺ௡ାଵሻమ
ሺܿு െ ܿ௅ሻଶ  and in the FPA is 
ଵ
௡ሺ௡ାଶሻሺ௡ାଵሻమ
ሺܿு െ ܿ௅ሻଶ; 
the difference is a factor of n2. The volatility of the supplier’s profit is much greater than the 
volatility of the buyer’s benefit. We summarize these observations with the following pair of 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Ia: The expected profit of a supplier is the same in the FPA and the EA.  
Hypothesis IIa: The variance of a supplier’s profit in a EAs prices is greater than that of 
the FPA.  
I formulate the next hypothesis by relaxing the constraint that all suppliers are risk neutral. 
When entering into a procurement process the outcomes are uncertain to the suppliers. However, 
because of the weakly dominant strategy, risk aversion does not affect suppliers’ predicted 
behavior or the resulting prices. This is not true for the FPA. Holt 1980 shows that if all suppliers 
have the same risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, then there exists 
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the expected price is lower than that of the EA.  
This issue is quite prominent in the experimental economics literature on single unit 
private value sealed bid sell auctions. Those experiments are a mirror image to the commodity 
procurement FPA. An auctioneer wishes to sell a single indivisible unit of a good and there are n 
possible buyers. Each buyer draws an independent private valuation from a uniform distribution 
on the interval [0, vH]. This valuation is an individual specific price that he can resell the object 
to the experimenter for. The symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for this auction is 
ܤሺݒ௜ሻ ൌ
௡ିଵ
௡
ݒ௜. 
Figure 2: Nash Equilibrium FPA Sell Auction 
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If we set the number of buyers to three and the highest possible valuation to twenty, we have the 
selling counterpart to our example. The equilibrium bidding function is depicted in Figure 2. 
Early studies - such as Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980 and Cox, Roberson, and Smith 
1982 - found that the vast majority of bids lay above the Nash equilibrium bidding line in Figure 
2 and below the forty-five degree line at which bid equals value in the area labeled the cone of 
risk averse bids. Consequently, they found that the first price sealed bid auction provided the 
buyer with higher average prices than those received in the English outcry auction. Cox, 
Roberson, and Smith suggests that these choices are the result of heterogeneous risk attitudes 
amongst the bidders.7 Further they propose a Nash equilibrium model in which a bidder’s risk 
attitude is characterized by a single parameter that is private information.8 Given Holt’s 
theoretical model of the FPA with risk averse suppliers and the strong empirical evidence from 
experiments of first price sealed bid sellers auctions we offer the following hypothesis 
 Hypothesis III: The expected or average price in the FPA will be lower than in the EA. 
 Our FPA investigation provides a unique opportunity to conduct a powerful test amongst 
competing behavioral hypotheses in the private value first price sealed bid auction. Notice in 
Figure 2 that the Nash equilibrium bid function also corresponds to the behavioral rule always 
bid a fixed proportion of your realized value. If we allow for heterogeneous risk attitudes then 
any estimated linear bid function, which goes through the origin and has slope less than one, is 
consistent with both fixed proportion of realized value and a Nash Equilibrium bid functions.9   
Now consider the FPA Nash equilibrium bid function depicted in Figure 1. In this case, 
these two behavioral rules generate quite distinct behavior. A Nash equilibrium bidder, demands 
zero margin when his has the worst (highest) cost realization, and his margin demanded, both 
proportional and absolute, increases as realized cost decreases. This pricing behavior is strikingly 
different from that of a supplier who simply demands a fixed percentage margin, i.e. their pricing 
                                                 
7 Other alternative models to explain this observation have been recently proposed such as regret theory, Filiz and 
Ozbay 2007 and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2006, and directional learning theory, Neugebauer 2006. 
8 There have been numerous studies which have addressed the appropriateness of the risk aversion explanation; 
Kagel and Levin 2008 provide a survey of these criticisms. 
9 Note that in the Holt model all bidders have the same risk attitude and would have the same bid function. 
Meanwhile, in the Cox, Roberson and Smith model subjects have heterogeneous risk attitudes and will have varying 
linear bidding strategies with one caveat. Above the threshold of the maximum possible bid of a risk neutral buyer, 
the bid function is strictly concave.   
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strategy is simply ݌௜ሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻܿ௜. In our data analysis, we also consider a third behavioral 
rule in which a supplier demands a constant absolute margin, or profit level. For this type of 
supplier his pricing function is of the form ݌௜ሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ܿ௜. Later, a mixture model based upon 
three rules is formulated and estimated. 
 
IV. Experimental Design and Procedures 
All experimental sessions were conducted at the Economics Laboratory at UCSD and at 
the NUS School of Business. All participants were either undergraduate or master level students 
at one of the two universities. FPA and EAs were conducted at both facilities. The number of 
participants in an experimental session consisted of some multiple of three between nine and 
eighteen. Experimental sessions lasted no more than one hour and subject earned between $8 
(S$12) and $60 (S$89) inclusive of a show-up fee. 
Session Treatment Location Number Subject Rounds
Minimum 
Earnings* 
Maximum 
Earnings* 
1 FPA UCSD 15 32 16.72 52.62 
2 FPA UCSD 15 32 11.00 58.98 
3 FPA UCSD 15 32 13.23 42.45 
4 FPA NUS 9 32 23.24 48.94 
5 FPA NUS 18 32 21.60 55.72 
6 EA UCSD 9 32 7.05 62.70 
7 EA NUS 9 32 30.78 87.84 
8 EA NUS 18 32 32.84 88.74 
 
Table 1: Summary of experimental sessions 
*Earnings are US$ for UCSD sessions and S$ for NUS sessions, the show-up fee is $5 at UCSD and 
S$10 at NUS, the exchange rate at the time of the sessions was approximately $1 = S$1.5. 
 
I adopted the simple previous three supplier example as the basis for our experiments. In 
a session, the subjects participated in series of thirty-two rounds of either FPA’s or EA’s. In each 
round, the subjects were randomly re-partitioned into a set of triads. The first two rounds were 
for practice; the subjects earned no money and the data is not reported. For the remaining rounds 
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the participants’ earnings were given in an experimental currency. The exchange rates were one 
experimental dollar to $0.33 (or S$0.50.) In total we conducted 720 FPA’s and 360 EA’s.10 
Participants made decisions through a personal computer running a custom designed 
software program, and in a partition designed to ensure private decisions. In the FPA, at the start 
of each period the subject is revealed his or her realized private cost (a new cost was drawn each 
period.) The subject was also shown the period number and the number of other subjects in the 
FPA. The subject was prompted to submit a price (restricted to be between zero and thirty), but 
could take as much time desired to do so. After all prices were submitted, the auction results 
were revealed. These results consisted of the bid submitted by the subject, the amount of the 
winning bid, and the subject’s period profit. All of the information was then entered into a 
display, along with the cumulative profit, at the bottom of the computer screen for future 
reference. At the conclusion of the experiment, subjects were informed of their total earnings and 
paid that amount privately.  
The EA experiment had the same procedures, except for the execution of auction. On the 
computer screen there was a display of the current auction price and a button that one could press 
to exit the auction. The auction started with an initial price of $21. Then the price was 
decremented at the rate of ten cents every half a second. As auction participants exited the 
auction, subjects could observe the decrement of the displayed number of participants remaining 
in the auction. At the close of the auction their cost, exit price, period profits, and cumulative 
profits were entered in history viewing area.   
V. Data Analysis and Results 
 We first address the relative performance of the two alternative procurement procedures, 
and observe that procurement costs are lower and less volatile in the FPA.  For suppliers, average 
profits are higher, but at the same time, more volatile in the EA.  
                                                 
10 Due to the strong agreement of the data with the weakly dominant bidding strategy in the reverse auction I 
collected an unbalanced sample.  
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Figure 3: Empirical cumulative distribution functions of FPA and EA prices 
 
Let’s start by considering the distributions of realized FPA and EA prices. Figure 3 
presents the empirical cumulative distribution functions of prices under the two different auction 
types. For now let’s assume that each of the m = 720 FPA prices is an independent realization 
from the continuous distribution WFPA generating the empirical CDF ഥܹFPA, and that each of the n 
= 360 EA prices is an independent realization from the continuous distribution WEA generating 
the empirical CDF ഥܹEA. I test the hypothesis that these two distributions are equal, versus the 
alternative they are not, with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test. The test-statistic is 
ܵҧ ൌ max௉| ഥܹFPAሺ݌ሻ െ ഥܹEAሺ݌ሻ| = 0.372, which has a p-value of essentially zero, and we reject 
that the underlying distribution of auction prices are the same. Casual inspection of Figure 3 also 
suggests that WEA first order stochastically dominates WFPA, in other words for every p 
EܹAሺ݌ሻ ൑ FܹPAሺ݌ሻ. Barret and Donald 2003 introduced a test for this hypothesis versus the 
alternative that for some p, EܹAሺ݌ሻ ൐ FܹPAሺ݌ሻ. The test statistic is  
ܵҧ ൌ ቀ
݉݊
݉ ൅ ݊
ቁ
ଵ ଶ⁄
max
௉
൫ ഥܹEAሺ݌ሻ െ ഥܹFPAሺ݌ሻ൯ ൌ 0.002. 
The p-value of this test statistic is great than 0.999, we leads us not to reject the hypothesis of 
first order stochastic dominance. Under the first order stochastic dominance criteria in decision 
0
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making (Seshadri et al 1991 and Levy 1992) the EA more strongly favors the suppliers rather 
than the procurement official. 
Result 1: Procurement prices in the EA first order stochastically dominate those in the 
FPA.  
 
 
 Mean Price Price Variance 
Mean Supplier 
Profit 
Supplier Profit 
Variance 
EA 
10.60 
10 
(0.230) 
19.11 
20 
[18.47, 21.61] 
1.68 
1.67 
(0.099) 
10.67 
15.03 
[12.79, 17.14] 
FPA 
7.90 
10 
(0.116) 
9.63 
10.67 
[5.63, 7.69] 
0.90 
1.67 
(0.037) 
3.04 
1.67 
[1.50, 1.84] 
Difference -25.5% -50.4% -46.3% -71.5% 
Table 2: Summary statistics on prices and profits 
   
Inspecting the mean and variance of the prices reveals that FPA delivers lower cost and 
lower price volatility to the procurement official. Table 2 present the means and variances of the 
two price distributions and the differences in these values. The first column shows the mean, the 
standard error of the means, and the percentage difference in prices. Two-tailed t-tests lead us to 
reject that the EA mean price (5% level of significance) and the FPA mean price (1% level of 
significance) are equal to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction of ten. Moreover, we reject 
that the mean prices are the same in favor of the hypothesis that the FPA mean price is lower by 
conducting a t-test for unequal variances (1% level of significance.) 
Result 2: Procurement prices are lower, 25.5% in fact, for the FPA. We reject hypothesis 
I in favor of hypothesis III.  
In the second column we report information for the variance on prices. Under the risk 
neutral Nash equilibrium bidding models, the variance of the prices in the EA and FPA are 
twenty and six and two-thirds respectively. We give the sample variances and beneath those we 
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give bootstraps of the 95% confidence intervals of the variance under Nash equilibrium.11 We 
can’t reject that the variance is equal to the predicted value in the EA, but we do reject this for 
the FPA as the estimated variance is well outside and above the confidence interval. When 
comparing the variances, we reject that hypothesis they are the same in favor of the hypothesis 
that the EA price have greater variance (Levin F-tests for heterogeneous variances at the 1% 
level of significance.) However, the price variance in the EA is only twice as large (i.e. the -50.4% 
change noted in the table,) not triple as predicted in theory. 
 Result 3: Procurement costs are more volatile in the EA. Our experimental results are 
consistent with hypothesis II. 
Thus, unless a procurement organization is very risk loving, the lower average price and lower 
price variability make the FPA the better method in the commodity situation. 
 What about the welfare of the suppliers? As we see in the third column, we can’t reject (t-
test at 1% level of significance) that the mean supplier profit in the EA is equal to the theoretical 
value of 1.67. Average supplier profit in the FPA is 46.3% lower, and we reject these profits are 
the same as the risk neutral Nash equilibrium bidding and the empirical mean of the average 
profit in the EA experiments (both at the 1% level of significance.) While suppliers actually do 
better on average in the EAs, the volatility of the payoffs are about two and a half times more 
volatile.  
 Result 4: Supplier’s profits are higher in the EA rather than the FPA and we reject 
hypothesis Ia. And we also find these profits are more volatile in the EA as well – confirming 
hypothesis IIa. 
 The relative performances of the two procurements methods are most consistent with risk 
averse Nash Equilibrium models. These results show promise that the robustness of this type of 
model would extend to other type of procurement and supply chain activities. But this model is 
formulated as a description of individual level behavior. So, this robustness likely only holds if 
the model explains what happens at the individual level. 
                                                 
11 Since the distribution of prices under Nash equilibrium in know to us and non-normal simple t-tests of the 
estimated variances are not valid. So, we bootstrap with 10,000 draws from the known distribution and then 
calculate the 95% confidence intervals for the theoretical values of the variance. 
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 Risk aversion does not affect the weakly dominant strategy in the EA, and we should 
observe those who exit an auction do so at their true costs. Figure 4 plots seller’s exit prices 
versus there realized costs. While much of the data does adhere closely to forty-five degree line 
as we would expect, there is a surprising amount that doesn’t.  Much of these occurrences are at 
high cost levels. There are a number of observations were a seller opts out as soon as possible 
when the auction opens at the price of $21: perhaps such a bidder is frustrated by receiving a 
high cost level? However, there is another story for the number of exit prices below cost. In most 
of these cases, subject remains in the auction while there are still two other remaining suppliers. 
Then, as soon as one of the other suppliers exits, this individual exits as well. To see the effect of 
how price determining bids depend upon costs, I plot the realized auction price versus the second 
lowest realized costs in Figure 5. Here one can see much crisper conformity with the forty-five 
degree line. To quantify this we present an OLS fitted trend line through the origin. The slope 
coefficient is essentially one and this regression explains over 93% of the variation as indicated 
by the R2 statistic. 
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Figure 4: Reverse Auction Exit Price Versus Costs
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Now let’s turn our attention to the individual subject behavior in the FPA sessions. Figure 
6 displays the 2160 submitted FPA bids versus realized costs,  the risk neutral Nash Equilibrium 
pricing function, the price equal to cost line (the forty-five degree line), and an OLS fitted line 
for the data. Clearly, the majority of bids are above cost but below the risk neutral Nash 
equilibrium price - just as a risk averse Nash model predicts. However, there are also a surprising 
amount of bids outside (particularly above) this cone of risk averse actions. I now proceed to 
formulate and estimate a model with discrete bidding rule heterogeneity that is consistent with 
this data.   
 
VI. A Model of Sophisticated and Rule of Thumb Bidders. 
 Consider a setting in which a supplier follows a rule r which belongs to a set of rules 
R={AM, PM, BR}. Let Π denote a probability distribution on this set for which πr is the 
probability a supplier is a bidder of type r. An AM, or absolute mark-up, bidder always demands 
a fixed profit amount independent of his costs. In other words, AM bidders price according to: 
஺ܾெሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ ܿ௜ ൅ ߢ,  
where κ is the fixed absolute mark-up. A PM, or proportional mark-up, bidder always demands a 
fixed percentage margin based on realized costs. His bidding rule is: 
ܾ௉ெሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻܿ௜, 
where ρ is the proportional mark-up. A BR, or strategic best response, bidder selects a price that 
maximizes his expected utility given Π  conditional upon his realized cost. For now let’s assume 
that a BR bidder prices according to a strictly increasing bounded function, thus having an 
inverse, denoted ܾ஻ோሺܿ௜ሻ . 
When a BR bidder formulates his bidding strategy it’s assumed that he knows the 
parameters Π, ρ, and κ ; and that he also has the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
function ܷሺݕሻ ൌ ߟݕଵ ఎ⁄   , where y is non-negative changes in wealth. If the BR wins the FPA his 
change in wealth is his bid minus his cost, otherwise there is no change in wealth. The BR 
bidder’s expected utility is the utility of his profit times the probability of winning the FPA – the 
probability his bid is lower than all other bidders.  This probability is  
17 
 
Pr൫݌௝ ൑ ݌௜൯ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߨ஺ெ െ ߨ௉ெሻPr ቀ݌௝ ൑ ܾ஻ோሺܿ௜ሻቁ ൅ ߨ஺ெPr൫݌௝ ൑ ܿ௜ ൅ ߢ൯
൅ ߨ௉ெPr൫݌௝ ൑ ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻܿ௜൯. 
Since each of the three bidding rules has an inverse we can restate this probability, F denotes the 
uniform distribution, as 
ܲݎ൫݌௝ ൑ ݌௜൯ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߨ஺ெ െ ߨ௉ெሻ ቂ1 െ ܨ ቀܾ஻ோିଵ൫݌௝൯ቁቃ ൅ ߨ஺ெൣ1 െ ܨ൫݌௝ െ ߢ൯൧
൅ ߨ௉ெ ቂ1 െ ܨ ቀ
௣ೕ
ଵାఘ
ቁቃ. 
 In an FPA with N – 1 other suppliers, the probability of winning with a bid price pj is  
ܲݎ൫݌௝ ൑ ݌௜, ݅ ൌ 1, ڮ , ܰ െ 1൯ ൌ ൣܲݎ൫݌௝ ൑ ݌௜൯൧
ேିଵ
. 
 Thus the expected utility of a bid pj conditional on realized cost cj is 
Eൣܷ൫݌௝| ௝ܿ൯൧ ൌ ߟሺ݌௜ െ ܿ௜ሻ
ଵ ఎൗ ቈሺ1 െ ߨ஺ெ െ ߨ௉ெሻ ቆ
ܿு െ ܾ஻ோିଵ൫݌௝൯
ܿு െ ܿ௅
ቇ ൅ ߨ஺ெ ቆ
ܿு െ ൫݌௝ െ ߢ൯
ܿு െ ܿ௅
ቇ
൅ ߨ௉ெ ቆ
ܿு െ ݌௝ 1 ൅ ߩ⁄
ܿு െ ܿ௅
ቇ቉
ேିଵ
 
The first order condition of maximizing expected utility with respect to the bid price is 
1
ߟ
൤ሺ1 െ ߨ஺ெ െ ߨ௉ெሻ ቀܿு െ ܾ஻ோିଵ൫݌௝൯ቁ ൅ ߨ஺ெ ቀܿு െ ൫݌௝ െ ߢ൯ቁ ൅ ߨ௉ெ ൬ܿு െ
݌௝
1 ൅ ߩ
൰൨
െ ሺܰ െ 1ሻሺ݌௜ െ ܿ௜ሻ ቈ
ሺ1 െ ߨ஺ெ െ ߨ௉ெሻ
ܾԢ஻ோ൫݌௝൯
൅ ߨ஺ெ ൅
ߨ௉ெ
1 ൅ ߩ቉
ൌ 0. 
Now if one assumes that all the BR bidders are using the same bid function, the above expression 
reduces to the following differential equation, 
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ܥு െ ܿ௜ ൅
ఘ
ଵାఘߨ௉ெܿ௜ ൅ ߨ஺ெߢ
݌௜ െ ܿ௜
ൌ
ߟሺܰ െ 1ሻሺ1 െ ߨ஺ெ െ ߨ௉ெሻ
ܾԢ஻ோ൫݌௝൯
൅ ሺߟሺܰ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1ሻ ൬ߨ஺ெ ൅
ߨ௉ெ
1 ൅ ߩ
൰. 
The solution and BR bidding function is 
ܾ஻ோሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ
ሺܥு ൅ ߨ஺ெߢሻሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ
൫1 ൅ ߩሺ1 െ ߨ௉ெሻ൯ܯ
൅
ܯ െ 1
ܯ
כ ܿ௜,   where ܯ ൌ  ߟሺܰ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1. 
There are several interesting things to note about the BR bid function. It is linear in cost. 
The slope depends upon the parameter of the expected utility function and the number of other 
bidders. Most surprising is that the probabilities of the absolute and percentage mark-up bidders, 
and the size of these mark-ups, only affect the intercept term; changes in these values only 
vertically shift the BR bid function.  
The mean and variance of the winning FPA price depends upon the distribution of each 
supplier i’s bid. This is given by  
ܳሺݖሻ ൌ Prሺ݌௜ ൑ ݖሻ ൌ ∑ ߨ௥ܨ൫ܾ௥ିଵሺݖሻ൯௥אோ , 
and the distribution of the winning, or minimum, bid is  
ܳଵሺݖሻ ൌ ሾ1 െ ܳሺݖሻሿேିଵ. 
When calculating the expectation and variance of the winning FPA price, it will involve piece-
wise integration of this function. The boundary points of these integrals depend upon the 
intersection points of the three bidding rules. Figure 7, depicts the scenario found in the 
subsequent data analysis.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Crossing Pattern of Bidding Functions 
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VII. Rule Switching Dynamics: Specification and Estimation of a Hidden Markov Model 
 
Given that subjects participate in repeated auctions, as suppliers likely do in practice, I 
explore the possibilities that individuals will adapt and switch bidding rules over time. I 
formulate such a process by assuming that there is an initial portion of subjects adopting each the 
three bidding rules. Then there is a stationary Markov process that governs the probabilities of 
switching from one rule to another. If a bidders following their adopted rules with some random 
noise, then the assignment of subjects to bidding rules is a latent variable. Such a state-space 
model with latent states is called a hidden Markov model (HMM). HMM’s are a natural way to 
model dynamic phenomenon in Marketing (Netzer,  Lattin, and Srinivasan 2008 study the 
relationships between charitable donors and institutions ) when subject passed through discrete 
paths (Hui, Fader, and Bradlow 2009 present a framework for general forms of path data) over 
time.  
 Consider the following stationary Marko process. Let zi,t be the rule used by subject i in 
period t, and  zi be the thirty element sequence of rules seller i adopts over the course of the 
experiment. Define πr1 as the probability a seller follows rule r in period 1, Π1 is the multinomial 
probability distribution  these initial probabilities constitute, and let A be the matrix of transition 
probabilities with element asr. In other words, the probability that a subject who uses rule s in 
period t-1 transitions to rule r in period t,  asr = P(zi,t=r| zi,t-1=s). Also denote μrt as the proportion 
of the subjects who are using rule r in period t. And finally let πrt be the period t probability a 
randomly selected subject is using rule r which is,  
ߨ௥௧ ൌ ∑ ߤ௦௧ିଵ௦אோ ܽ௦௥.  
When a subject follows rule r the price he submits is an independent random variable that 
follows a normal distribution G with mean br(cit) and rule specific variance σr.  The probability 
densities of the three bidding rules are 
݄஺ெ൫݌௜௧|ܿ௜௧;ߢ൯ ൌ ܩሺܿ௜௧ ൅ ߢ, ߪ஺ெଶ ሻ; 
݄௉ெ൫݌௜௧|ܿ௜௧;ߩ൯ ൌ ܩ൫ሺ1 ൅ ߩሻܿ௜௧, ߪ௉ெଶ ൯; and 
݄஻ோ൫݌௜௧|ܿ௜௧;ߎ௧, ߢ, ߩ൯ ൌ ܩ ቆ
ሺܥு ൅ ߨ஺ெ௧ߢሻሺ1 ൅ ߩሻ
൫1 ൅ ߩሺ1 െ ߨ௉ெ௧ሻ൯ܯ
൅
ܯ െ 1
ܯ
ܿ௜௧, ߪ஻ோଶ ቇ. 
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The set of parameters of this model is Θ = (ΘM,ΘB), where ΘM is the set of variables governing 
the stochastic process of rule adoption, {Π1, A}, and ΘB is set of parameters that determine the 
bidding rules {κ, ρ,η,σr}. The likelihood of subject i’s sequence of prices conditional upon the 
parameters Θ and the realization of zi is  
 
ܮ௜ሺ݌௜ଵ, ڮ , ݌௜ଷ଴|ݖ௜, ߠሻ ൌ ∏ ݄௭೔భሺ݌௜௧|ܿ௜௧, ߠሻ
ଷ଴
௧ୀଵ , 
 
and the likelihood of zi condition upon ΘB is 
 
ܮ௜ሺݖ௜|ߠெሻ ൌ ߨ௭೔భ ∏ ܽ௭೔೟షభ௭೔೟
ଷ଴
௧ୀଶ . 
 
I can express the likelihood of the joint sequences of bids and bidding rule adoption as 
 
ܮ௜ሺ݌௜ଵ, ڮ , ݌௜ଷ଴, ݖ௜|ߠሻ ൌ ܮ௜ሺ݌௜ଵ, ڮ , ݌௜ଷ଴|ݖ௜, ߠሻܮ௜ሺݖ௜|ߠெሻ. 
 
However, since the realization state is not observable I need to integrate out the marginal 
likelihood of zi by summing over all possible sequences of rule adoption 
 
ܮ௜ሺ݌௜ଵ, ڮ , ݌௜ଷ଴|ߠሻ ൌ ∑ ܮ௜ሺ݌௜ଵ, ڮ , ݌௜ଷ଴|ݖ௜, ߠሻܮ௜ሺݖ௜|ߠெሻ௭೔א௓ . 
 
Finally the Likelihood for the whole sample is 
 
ܮሺܺ|ߠሻ ൌ ∏ ∑ ܮ௜ሺ݌௜ଵ, ڮ , ݌௜ଷ଴|ݖ௜, ߠሻܮ௜ሺݖ௜|ߠெሻ௭೔א௓
଻ଶ
௜ୀଵ .                                                              
 
A common way to find the parameter values which maximize ܮሺܺ|ߠሻ is to use the Baum-Welch 
algorithm, which is a special case of the EM-algorithm.12 The output of this algorithm provides 
posterior modes of ΘM, an estimated most likely path ݖపෝ  for each subject, and maximum 
likelihood estimates of ΘG.  
However, there is one issue preventing the estimation of the model as specified: the 
intercept term of strategic bidding rule depends of the distribution over types and thus is a 
function of the parameters in ΘM. To resolve this issue I change the specification of bBR to a fixed 
effect model 
ܾ஻ோሺܿ௜௧ሻ ൌ ∑ ܫۃௗୀ௧ۄߙ௧ଷ଴ௗୀଵ ൅
ெିଵ
ெ
ܿ௜௧,   where ܯ ൌ  ߟሺܰ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1, and I  
 
                                                 
12 For details on these two algorithms we refer the reader to the classic presentation in Rabiner 1989. 
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is an indicator function. To check to appropriateness of this specification, I calculate the 
theoretical value of the intercept of the BR bid function for each time period t using the 
maximum likelihood estimated values of the mark-up and the proportions of subjects estimated 
to be using each rule in period t according to the ݖపෝ. Subsequently, these values are compared to 
the estimated dummy variables.  
 
Model Intercept t-stat Slope t-stat ߪܣܯ
2  
AM 0.80 37.36 1.00 - 0.50
PM 0.00 - 1.30 10.93 5.27
BR 4.43 25.59 0.79 35.54 1.30
 
Table 3: Hidden Markov model estimates of bidding rule parameters 
 Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of each of the three 
bidding rules. Note all parameter estimates are significant. For the AM rule, the estimated mark-
up is a mere eighty cents, suggesting aggressive bidding to win the FPA. One the other hand, for 
the PM rule the estimated mark-up is thirty percent over costs, suggesting aggressive bidding for 
a large profit. The standard error for this rule is much higher than the standard errors of the other 
two rules, symptomatic there could be heterogeneity in the percentage mark-ups used by 
individuals. For the BR bidding rule, the inferred value of η is 1.84, which yields a constant 
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.56 – in line with the estimates from other studies of 
private value first price sealed bid auctions.13 
                                                 
13 For example, consider some other estimates of constant coefficient of relative risk aversions of 0.67, 0.52, 0.48, 
and 0.57 respectively from Cox and Oaxaca 1996, Goeree et al 2002, Chen and Plott 1998, and Berg et al 2005. 
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Figure 8: Theoretical values of the BR rule intercept over time vs. Estimated Fixed Effects 
 
 Recall that instead of estimating the exact BR bidding rule with non-linear constraints on 
the model parameters, I estimated a fixed effect model. Figure 8 presents a comparison of these 
estimated fixed effects versus the theoretical value of the BR rule intercept based upon the 
estimates of the mark-up sizes and the estimated proportions of subjects using each rule each 
period. Visual inspection reveals that the theoretical value of the intercept varies little over time, 
and that the dummy variable model also does not vary a lot. In fact, only three of the fixed 
effects are significantly different than the mean effect. This suggests that there is little dramatic 
movement in the use of different rules over time. We now examine this more explicitly. 
  zit=AM zit=PM zit=BR 
zit-1=AM 0.78 0.00 0.22 
zit-1=PM 0.00 0.87 0.13 
zit-1=BR 0.10 0.02 0.88 
 
Table 4: Posterior mode estimates of rule switching probabilities 
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The posterior mode estimates of the Markov process parameters reveal a surprising 
amount of inertia in rule adoption, and rather than developing strategic sophistication the 
percentage of BR bidders diminishes over time. The estimated initial distribution over the rules is  
Π෡ଵ ൌ ൫ߨො஺ெଵߨො௉ெଵ,ߨො஻ோଵ,൯ ൌ ሺ0.12, 0.14, 0.74ሻ , and the estimated matrix of transition 
probabilities ܣመ is given in Table 4. There a several interesting results one can draw from this 
estimated Markov process. First, there is strong inertia in the rules subjects follow. The 
continuation probabilities range from seventy-eight to eighty-eight percent. Second, there is no 
switching between the two simple rules of thumbs. The only rule transitions are between AM and 
BR, and PM and BR. While it’s not surprising subjects switch from simple mark-up price rules to 
the more strategically sophisticated strategy, it’s surprising that there are subjects who switch 
from the BR rule to simple mark-up strategies. In these cases, it’s mostly the absolute mark-up 
rule that is switched to. Why would someone make such a switch? A natural conjecture that 
estimated AM rule has a small mark-up, and that following that rule will lead to more frequent 
wins in the auction.14 
 
Figure 9: The estimated sequence of proportions of subjects using the three rules. 
 
                                                 
14 The natural way to explore hypothesis of this nature would be to model the transition probabilities as functions of 
the history of actions and payoffs. Unfortunately, there simply isn’t enough variation in the rule switching to 
generate estimated transitional probabilities that have covariates. 
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The dynamics of the estimated model suggests the rule adjustments mostly occur early in 
the experiment and involve decaying proportion of sophisticated sellers. In Figure 8, we present 
the sequence of estimated proportions of subjects for each period in time, μrt. Notable here is that 
initially seventy-six percent of the subjects are estimated to be using a strategic best-response 
strategy but that proportion over the course of thirty auctions falls to sixty-four percent. 
Meanwhile we see an accordingly strong increase in the proportion of AM bidders from eleven 
percent to twenty-nine percent; and the percentage of PM bidders falls from thirteen to nine 
percent. In this estimated rule switching model, would the subjects learn to be more sophisticated 
in a much longer sequence of auctions? Actually, the prospect of further learning is not strong. 
The limiting distribution of the matrix of transition probabilities is Π∞ = (0.28, 0.10, 0.62). 
Inspection of Figure 8 shows that the experiment has already converged close to these values.  
 
Figure 10: Empirical versus theoretical mean and variance of price 
Theoretical values calculated using HMM parameter estimates.  
 
 Does this estimated model explain the deviations of price performance from the 
predictions of the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model? As discussed earlier, the sample mean 
has a small but statistically significant negative time trend, while the sample variance does 
appear to have a negative but not significant time trend. Figure 10 depicts, the theoretical mean 
and variance calculated using the estimated rule switching model parameters as well as the 
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empirical measurements of price mean and variance. Visual inspection suggests that the rule 
switching model qualitatively captures the values and trend, and I find this encouraging. 
However, regressions of the observed averages on the theoretical predictions aren’t significant – 
although the coefficients are close to one in both cases. For this experiment the time variance of 
price average and variance dynamics adjust too little over time to provide a dynamic model a 
strong opportunity to explain, or fail to explain, these dynamics. There is a plan to run future 
experiments that hopefully will create such an opportunity.  
VIII. Discussion 
 Our experiments provide a clear demonstration of the relative performance of the FPA 
versus the EA in a commodity procurement setting.  In light of these results, any procurement 
organization should proceed cautiously when initiating a reverse auction strategy with the 
purchase of commodities. From the procurement organization’s perspective EAs not only deliver 
higher expected prices, but also greater price variability.  It is worth noting that increased price 
variability, has a negative impact beyond a procurement organization’s distaste of increased 
price uncertainty. Recent research studies, Jap [2007] and Haruvy and Jap [2008], have 
documented that relationship between suppliers and buyers is negatively impacted by the 
adoption of the reverse auction. The documented increase in price variance can be at least a 
partial source of this seller animosity. 
 Beyond summarizing our results, we want to consider why our results contradict the 
frequently reported successes in first trials of reverse auctions? The issue of price variance is 
again a possible source. Higher price volatility generates a larger number of “great” successes 
when switching from the FPA to the EA, of course there will also be more spectacular failures as 
well. If there is a bias in reporting successful versus negative outcomes - for examples see An-
Wen Chan et al (2004) and Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) - then we should see more 
reports of successful initial reverse auctions. However, instead of just assuming there is a 
reporting bias, let’s consider how our commodity sourcing experiment might differ from those in 
the field. 
 In our study we fixed the number of potential suppliers and made several strong 
assumptions; relaxing any of these could lead to different outcomes. In practice, it’s likely that 
when initiating reverse auction sourcing variables other than the auction format change. Such e-
sourcing efforts typically include attempts to increase the number of qualified participating 
26 
 
suppliers. It’s clear in both the FPA and the reverse auction increasing the number of suppliers 
will reduce price, but all of our theories suggest that the FPA will still retain its advantages.  
 In our analysis we assume suppliers independently draw costs from the same distribution. 
If we relax that assumption, for example one supplier has a clear advantage in location and likely 
lower cost, and then the better sourcing practice is not so evidently clear. Theoretical studies, 
such as Maskin and Riley (2000) and Cantillon (2008), predict that whether a EA will lead to 
lower price depends crucially on the distributions of costs. Experiments such as Guth et al(2005) 
reveal that subjects overbid, not realizing how competitively strong their positions are at times, 
from theoretical bid functions in such environments.  
 One area where reverse auctions do show much promise is in the procurement of goods 
for which price is not the only differing attribute between suppliers.  Researchers have studied 
two cases: when non-price attributes are exogenous and when they are determined within the 
auction. Engelbrech-Wiggans, Haruvy, and Katok (2007) find significant gains to the 
procurement official when suppliers bid on price, and then the buyer chooses the winner versus 
awarding the contract to the lowest bidder. The performance of the buyer determined winner 
auction versus the FPA in these setting is studied in Haruvy and Katok (2008), and they find the 
FPA is better if suppliers have accurate and precise information regarding the quality of other 
sellers. On the other hand, Shachat and Swarthout (2010), find that an EA with buyer assigned 
bidding credits can provide better outcomes than the FPA for both suppliers and sellers. There is 
also a large and promising literature on successful reverse auction examples where the quality is 
determined within the reverse auction, for example Chen-Ritzo et al (2005) and Parkes and 
Kalagnanam (2005). 
 In summary, the knowledge gained in our study can inform procurement organizations 
that commodity buys may not be the optimal place to start a reverse auction initiative. Also, for 
the literature on sealed bid auctions our procurement framing permitted a new identification of 
bidding heterogeneity across individuals.  Further investigations of what drives the evolution of 
this rule of thumb heterogeneity and what other types of environments does it exists are needed. 
Through the use of game theoretic arguments and controlled laboratory experiments were able to 
justify our results. Perhaps practitioners will see the value of the tandem use of these tools is for 
addressing other procurement problems.  
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